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Abstract: The objective of this study was to provide evidence of the challenges and barriers 
affecting the role of auditors and auditors’ independence in Nigeria. A number of studies 
have been done on auditor’s independence but little attention is given to the pressures faced 
by auditors that affect their independence. This study adopts a qualitative method and reports 
on the barriers that affect auditor’s independence. Based on the interview with 32 staff that 
are either auditors or have come in contact with auditors during their course of work, this 
study identifies the barriers that affect auditors’ independence. These barriers include time 
pressure to complete tasks, management interest, incentives given to auditors by 
management, bribery and the level of corruption in the society, and the legal framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper addresses the barriers arising from auditors’ ability to perform their auditing 
function and its effectiveness on disclosure practices. Recently, auditors perform 
inadequately in the recent financial crisis of 2008 and several scandals in the 1990s and 
2000s have been traced to poor quality audit. Auditors were criticized by the public for 
failing to detect risks and misstatements in some big companies notably Lehman Brothers 
and AIG (Chen and Zhang, 2012). For example, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed many 
accounting problems such as the failure of the audit industry to identify problems in the 
financial sector. As a result, this was regarded as one of the major reasons for the financial 
meltdown in 2008. The accounting firm, Ernst and Young representing Lehman Brothers, 
was aware of the Repo 1051 practice but did not question it, disclose it or expose Lehman’s 
failure to adhere to good management practices, ultimately, leading to the demise of the 
banking giant, Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Also, in 2008, the PriceWaterhouse 
Cooper, the AIG’s auditor, was also blamed for not issuing a timely disclosure of AIG. The 
insurance company was involved in the sell of massive amounts of insurance without hedging 
its investment. These huge sales of credit default swaps were made without putting up initial 
collateral, a major weakness in risk management and failure in corporate governance 
practices (Chen and Zhang, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, auditors play a crucial role in corporate governance most especially in 
expressing an opinion about the truth and fairness of a financial statement (Okike 2004). 
Therefore, the financial statement has become a prerequisite for determining financial 
performance if auditors attest that the financial statement is free from material misstatement, 
this implies that they show a true and fair view of the company. According to Mgbame et al 
(2012) the audit quality reflects the significance of fairness in enhancing the credibility and 
quality of financial statements to stakeholders involve in the usage of accounting information. 
Auditors could give inappropriate audit opinion in situations where independence is 
threatened. It has been argued that the possibility for auditors to falsely say that a company’s 
financial statement represents their true state of financial performance and position should not 
be ruled out (Wallace 1992 and Okike 2007).  
 
Pickett (2011) noted that some external auditors, especially partners work in favour of top 
management, particularly when the chief financial officer (CFO) is responsible for the 
‘auditors employment prospects, fees and other consulting work’ (Pickett 2011). Pickett 
further argues that most financial statement do not give true picture of company activities 
especially when an accounting policy is applied to some set of accounts. For example, when 
dealing with off balance sheet financing, accounting policy are interpreted in a way that will 
give a reflection of what the directors wants it to be or look like.  
 
This study argues that certain barriers exist which makes it difficult for auditors to apply 
professional scepticism. These barriers affect auditors’ independence and make them work in 
favour of top management to materially misstate financial statement. This paper aimed to 
address these problems affecting auditors’ independence by identifying the barriers that affect 
auditors’ work in Nigeria. The remainder of this paper organizes as follows. In section 2, we 
discuss the background and literature on the auditors and their role in corporate governance 
practices. We present the research design and methodology in section 3. Results are reported 
in section 4 while section 5 shows the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The audited financial reports of organisations show their true financial performance and 
position (Okike 1989; Malaguen et al 2010). Alabede (2012) argued that corporate auditing is 
one of the ways of providing assurance to investors. Okike (1999) noted that most companies 
will benefit from corporate auditing irrespective of their size and it gives confidence to 
investors. Tomasic (1992) states that in order to ensure effective auditing there is the need to 
clarify the duties of the auditors. This will reduce bias auditing and corporate scandals. One 
of the reasons for the change in company law is because of financial scandals (Lee 2002).  
 
Generally, the collapse and failures of organizations has been traced to fraudulent financial 
reporting such as in the case of the 2000s scandals that resulted in a credibility crisis for the 
auditing profession. For example, it was the fraudulent financial reporting of Arthur 
Andersen for Enron that led to collapse of the consulting firm and Enron. These scandals led 
to the interventions by governments and regulators that led to the formulation of Sarbanes-
Oxley Acts of 2002 (Knechel et al., 2007). 
 
Furthermore, if the company were to fail or collapse after certain months of being audited, 
then the auditors would be blamed for not conducting a quality audit (Dopuch 1988). 
Wherever there is a financial scandal, the question to be asked is ‘did the auditors carry out 
their responsibilities properly?’ (Reilly 2006). Auditors should obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence before reaching a conclusion on a subject matter in order to ensure that the 
financial statement gives a true and fair view. 
 
It is the auditor’s responsibility to report the true and fair state of an organisation’s financial 
statement (Okike 1989, 1999, 2004; Sikka 2009; Malaguen et al 2010), which is in line with 
Section 359 (1) of the CAMA (1990). Auditors can carry out their duties effectively if they 
are independent (Peel and O’Donnell 1995). They should apply professional skepticism 
during their audit (Carmichael 1977). They should also maintain good corporate governance 
(Ali 1999) and adopt good corporate governance practices (Anandarajah 2001). The Code 
noted that the audit committee should review any issue that will lead to audit scope limitation 
or problems encountered by auditors and how management responded to them. This is 
because quality auditing is part of the objective of good corporate governance (Low 2002). 
Moreover, there is a positive effect between corporate governance mechanisms and 
accountability (Dewing and O’Russell 2004). Nevertheless, corporate governance is an 
important tool investors use to decide whether to invest in a company (McKinsey and Co 
2002). Okike (1989, 1994, 1999 and 2007) noted that the audit function is one of the 
mechanisms that enhance confidence in corporate annual reporting. 
 
Financial misstatements presented to users of information will cause stakeholder to make an 
incorrect judgement based on the inaccuracy of the financial statement (Okike 1999; Wallace 
1992; Owoyemi 1990). In recent times, an external auditor’s role includes reporting on the 
organization’s financial statement as a going concern, and detecting and reporting fraud and 
illegal acts discovered during the course of their assignment (Porter 2009). Despite the role of 
auditors in reporting on companies’ financial statements, most of them have faced a lot of 
pressure. These pressures according to Okike (1998; 1999; 2004) arise from socio-economic, 
political and cultural environments where they are located. She noted that the accounting 
profession must remain abreast of current developments and should be proactive in making 
changes in the internal and external reporting environment (Okike 1998; 1999; 2004; 2007). 
This study adds to literature and identifies the barriers that affect auditor’s work in Nigeria. 
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2.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
The privilege of the accountancy profession as a regulator is dependent on the belief that it should 
maintain independence from what it regulates. For example, the auditing firms should serve the public 
interest (Sikka and Willmott 1995), an awareness that is frequently repeated by those who speak for 
the profession (Lickiss 1990; McNeil 1992; Plaistowe 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Regulation Review 
Working Party, 1995). 
The United States and United Kingdom capital markets, as well as independent accounting bodies are 
seen as not only essential, but also as interdependent institutions for regulating the accounting 
profession (Chua and Poullaos 1993; Sikka and Willmott 1995; Singh and Zammit 2006). Researchers 
have argued that studying the relationship between the accounting profession and the state is very 
important in understanding the accounting regulations (Gray 1988). Stock exchange, professional 
bodies and other institutions in Anglo-American countries are usually self-regulated and do not have 
interference from the state (Greenspan 1998). Prior researches have claimed that these institutions and 
professional bodies need the state backing in order to uphold the status quo (Willmott et al 1992; 
Sikka and Willmott 1995). 
Regulators including government bodies, institutions and code of corporate governance are 
empowered with authority to provide the checks and balances (Banker et al 2010). They rely on 
controls, compliance and reports from the auditors and accountants who are responsible for certifying 
the true financial position of the companies. These regulators are required to comply with the ethical 
norm of accuracy of information and the social norm of transparency of information (Ahn and Choi 
2008; Edwards and Wolfe 2007). However, the recent scandal of Arthur Anderson revealed an 
economic motivation of earning consulting fees rather than ethical and social norm compliance of 
accuracy and transparency, indicating how management and auditors work to achieve their selfish 
interests (Nwabueze and Mileski 2008). 
The rules and regulation put in place within an environment could influence the role of auditors. 
Researchers such as Klapper and Love (2003) have suggested a link between corporate governance 
and the development of a regulatory/legal environment. For instance, Klapper and Love (2003) 
reported that companies that are located in countries that have weak legal systems will on average 
have lower governance ratings. They found that good corporate governance was positively correlated 
with operating performance and market valuation. This implies a positive correlation between 
company performance and the effectiveness of the regulatory environment. They further argued that 
the degree of flexibility of firms on their own corporate governance might be smaller in countries that 
have weak laws. Weak laws create an inherent and control risk at the financial statement level. The 
quality of audit work will depends on the behaviour of management towards the compliance 
of regulation when the corporate governance is weak.  
Garcia and Liu (1999) tried to provide a link between governance mechanisms and the regulatory 
environment. They wrote that regulatory environments that support compulsory disclosure of reliable 
information would enhance investor’s confidence and participation. The capacity to encourage trading 
and investment in the stock exchange will depend on the level of confidence investors have on the 
regulation. 
In a study conducted to analyse the cultural impact on Chinese corporate disclosure, Qu and Leung 
(2006) suggest that as culture changes, most companies were willing to supply voluntary information 
in addition to those that were required to be disclosed. Most of the information disclosed relate to 
employee issues and stakeholder interests. These disclosures according to Thomsen (2004) encourage 
interactions among stakeholders, employees, and customers while at the same time, shape 
organisational value.  
Ahn and Choi (2008) wrote that when banks strengthen and increase their monitoring roles, there 
seems to be a decrease in the bank’s earning management behaviour. They concluded that the role 
monitoring plays in banks is very vital in the study of regulatory practices. Steinwand (2000) 
suggested that companies should have an internal auditor who will report to the board directly. The 
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reason for having an internal auditor is to provide the board with an independent and objective 
assessment of the company’s operations as well as improving financial and social performance.  
Allen and Gale (2000) warned regarding the efficacy of monitoring; they pointed out that board 
monitoring in most cases is not efficient as a result of the company financing out of retained earnings. 
Owners will attain more benefit by giving or extending control to the CEO. The CEO should be 
responsible for control especially when the business is surrounded with greater uncertainty. When 
control is in the hand of CEOs they could pressurise the auditor to do things in a certain manner when 
they have something to hide. This create discrepancy between the CEO’s interests and the auditors’ 
independence. On the other hand, Jiang et al (2008) concluded that firms with weak control 
mechanisms are more likely to manage earnings in order to achieve analysts’ forecast.  
In a study on the Ukrainian stock exchange, Dean and Andreyeva (2001) wrote that the regulatory 
environment could affect the kind of governance structure that is put in place. The authors identified 
that the weakness of Ukraine’s legal and regulatory environment could support concentrated 
ownership pattern over diffused ownership structures. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) concluded 
that bidding from a country with stronger shareholder orientation leads to improvement of target 
assets than a country with a poor stock record which results in lower target asset. Weak regulatory 
frameworks have been a major challenge for the nature and scope of work for the auditing profession, 
with developing countries being the most affected. Accounting fraud and scandals exist due to 
presence of weak regulation and compliance. Tomlinson (2017) noted that ‘where governance 
architectures are stronger, the role played by professional accountants in tackling corruption is 
amplified’. 
2.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
 
Issues concerning regulatory framework of organizations in Nigeria are laid down by the provisions 
of company legislation called Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA 1990). The structure 
of this company legislation can be traced to Nigerian colonial history (Wallace 1992; Ogbechie et al 
2009).  Nigeria, like most other countries colonised by Britain, inherited at independence, many rules 
and regulations that were left behind by the colonial master (Wallace 1988). The reason why the 
Nigerian legal system, accounting and corporate governance practices mirrored the UK pattern was 
that during the period of colonization, the British introduced their company legislation into the 
country (Okike 2007).  
Nevertheless, as Okike (2007) argued, this mimicking of UK’s Companies Act without taken 
cognisance of culture and management behaviour suggest that the company legislation in Nigeria had 
failed to address the company law problems that were peculiar to Nigeria’s political and socio-cultural 
environment. It can be argued that the country’s rapid economic and commercial developments were 
not seriously dealt with by the Combined Code (Okike, 2007).  
 
Okike (1994) provided further clues into Nigeria’s curious effort to reflect its peculiar socio-economic 
and political culture in company legislation. Therefore, it can be deduced from the preceding 
historical discussion that the Nigerian corporate governance system is a reflection of its British 
tradition (Wallace 1992). Failure of corporate governance to reflect the culture of the society 
have led to poor audit work and bad management behaviour. These create an atmosphere where 
top management, CEO and board members, and auditors form a particular behaviour contrary to 
company policies during decision making, thereby resulting in corporate collapse and scandals (Okike 
2007; Sweeney 2008; Mintz 2005). The collapsed of companies around the world have 
emphasised evidence of poor quality auditing and bias professional scepticism. 
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2.3 CORPORATE SCANDALS 
Accounting fraud perpetuated by top management from Enron, Parmalat, Nigerian Unilever etc are 
good examples of poor auditor’s professional judgement and bias reporting (Morey et al 2008; 
Edwards and Wolfe 2007). This culture of poor auditing have soared in recent times. For example, 
three directors of one of the largest supermarket groceries in UK, Tesco Plc, was found wanting of 
manipulating company earnings to the tune of £263million from February to September 2014 (Butler 
2016). These three directors were charged with fraud, false accounting and abused of power on 22 
September 2016. If found wanting could spend up to 10 years behind bars. Apart from these three 
directors in fraud involvement, the auditors were not excluded as well. For instance, when a new team 
of accountants were called upon to look at Tesco plc activities they found out that the financial 
statement of one of its Irish operations have not given a true picture of its business activity for many 
years as a result of poor auditing (Butler 2016).  
It was reported in the dailies that Astrazeneca, one of Britain top drugmaker, was involved in bribery 
allegation for more than a 10 year period, including claims that it organised faked conferences, offer 
bribes, and falsely recorded incorrect transactions (Tobin 2016). The US SEC noted that the company 
was able to fake accounts using doctors’ names, generated fake invoices and created bogus 
conferences with payment made to speakers that never existed. Astrazeneca was able to get assistance 
from local officials in China by giving them tips to avoid paying local fines. Despite these allegations 
the company noted that they fully cooperated with the regulatory bodies during investigation, but 
refused to accept nor denied wrong doing (Tobin 2016).  
On the other hand, the management of Wells Fargo dismissed 5300 employees for opening fake 
unauthorised bank accounts in customers’ names, using fake ID, without the knowledge of customers 
(Egan 2016). This opening of fake accounts have been in operation since 2011. During these period, 
Wells Fargo witnessed increased profit growth, achieved high sales target and improved earnings. 
This created an environment for rewarding employees who achieved hit sales target through 
fraudulent means (Egan 2016). The quality of audit’s work performed by KPMG on Wells Fargo have 
been questioned by two US senators: Edward Markey and Elizabeth Warren, and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have requested a review of KPMG’s audit on Wells Fargo 
(Gosling 2017). 
A year after PWC took over from EY in 2016 as the auditor for Toshiba, PWC refused to sign off the 
2017 account as a result of the ‘regulatory sanctions on EY for failing to spot signs of Toshiba’s 
US$1.3bn accounting scandal’ (Gosling 2017). 
In 2011 Jimmy Ming Miu, an IT systems manager for McKay Shipping, defrauded his employer by 
submitting fake-inflated invoices for IT suppliers that was never requested nor supplied (Jordan 
2015). Miu was able to submit 55 invoices to McKay Shipping worth over $1million from 2000 to 
2006. Miu was repatriated back to New Zealand where he faced 55 count charges and was sentenced 
to thirty nine months imprisonment (Jordan 2015).  
Furthermore, Michael Swann an employee of Otago District Health Board, was able to dupe his 
employer to the tune of almost $17million for a period of more than six years (Jordan 2015). Mr 
Swann was able to connive with a company called Sonnoford Solutions owned by Kerry Harford to 
defraud his employer. Similarly, Vicky Lee Kyle, an accounts officer in Hastings, produced fake 
invoices for payment into her bank account. She was able to get accessed into the company online 
accounting data base where she changed the payment record to her name. When those fake invoices 
was approved by management Kyle was able to transfer $600,000 into her bank account for over a six 
year period (Jordan 2015). 
KPMG dismissed six employees, made up of the US head audit practice, four partners and one 
employee, for receiving advance warning that their engagement will be inspected by PCAOB but was 
not reported to management (Gosling 2017). An employee of KPMG knew of the inspection because 
he/she have recently worked with PCAOB and have access to confidential information. This breach of 
confidential information undermine the integrity of the regulatory process (Gosling 2017).  
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Hemant Kumar Maharaj defrauded his employer, North Shore City council, to the tune of almost 
$829,000 over a period of ten years (Jordan 2015). He connived with Suresh Din to submit fake 
invoices of uncompleted road maintenance work for payment. After the council have paid for the fake 
invoices Mr Din and Mr Maharaj shared the profit (Jordan 2015). 
Senior executives and members of board of directors of the above companies, including auditors and 
members of audit committees, had failed to live up to the expectation of their fiduciary duties (Dujuan 
2009; Becht et al 2003; Tudway and Pascal 2006; Handley-Schachler et al 2007; Dalton and Dalton 
2008). Likewise, the need to address the European corporate governance systems was necessitated by 
the forgery of a letter saying an Italian company – Parmalat – had US$4.9 billion on deposit at Bank 
of America as well as the embezzlement of the company’s funds by senior management staff, when in 
fact, it did not (Mintz 2005). 
The negligence on the part of the board of directors to exercise their duty of care in oversight roles is 
becoming a serious issue (Marks 2009; Bebchuk and Fried 2006). Enron’s board of directors failed to 
properly scrutinize the firm’s incentive compensation plans which encouraged senior management to 
publicly exaggerate the company’s stock thereby enabling employees to include it in their 401(k) 
retirement plan (Mintz 2005). While basing their facts on the Employee Benefit Research Institute, 
Smith (2002) and Mintz (2005) noted that about 58 per cent of Enron’s assets 401(k) plan was 
invested in the firm’s stock. When the value of the stock decreased from as high as US$90 per share 
to below 50 cents, about 12,000 Enron employees witnessed losses in their retirement accounts. 
During the same period, Ken Lay, Enron’s former CEO sold about 2.3 million shares for US$123.4 
million. 
Furthermore, the report from an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Department of Justice of 20 corporate frauds indicated that US$236 billion was wiped off from the 
shareholder value between the time the public first learned of the fraud and the reporting date, 3 
September 2002 (Mintz 2005). In 2017, Asa Resource Group sacked its CEO and Finance director 
after discovering that company funds were diverted from Zimbabwe to unrelated organisations in 
China (Gosling 2017). Furthermore, Shell and Eni were accused of paying bribe to a former Nigerian 
oil minister Dan Etete to the tune of US$1.3bn for extraction of petroleum resources (Gosling 2017).  
Dujuan (2009) noted that most CEOs take advantage of the weaknesses in corporate governance to 
their personal advantage by misappropriating company’s funds. Dujuan examined the inefficient 
American corporate governance before and during the financial crisis and China’s experience. He 
argued that the main failure of corporate governance was the very ineffective oversight of directors, 
which failed to curb executives’ greed. Dujuan gave an example with Mr. Fuld who was the CEO of 
Lehman Brothers. Dujuan based his conclusion on the calculations of Equilar, an executive pay 
research company, noting that from 1993 to 2007 Mr Fuld took about half a billion dollars in 
compensation. He also noted that Mr Fuld’s 2008 earnings were about $45 million, which translates 
approximately to $17,000 an hour. According to Dujuan, this figure is enough to wipe out a firm. He 
concluded by saying ‘he was delighted to announce that Mr. Fuld is the winner of his annual Michael 
Eisner Award for corporate capacity and poor corporate governance’ (Dujuan 2009). 
These issues of corporate scandals were what led to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by the US 
Congress (Dalton and Dalton 2008). The Act was signed into law in August 2002 by President Bush 
(Sweeney 2008; Epps and Cereola 2008). The aim of the Act was to respond to corporate failures by 
strengthening the regulatory corporate governance systems (Mintz 2005; Epps and Cereola 2008). On 
the contrary, US companies have complained that the cost of complying with the Act, most especially 
the certification of financial statements by chief executives officials, chief financial officers and 
internal control assessments exceeded the benefits derived from it. Standard No. 2 of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) directs auditors to perform a series of 
“walkthroughs” of transactions to assess internal control systems. This led to an increase in the 
average estimated cost incurred during the first-year implementation of the Act by large companies. 
This amounted to the tone of US$35 million (Mintz 2005; Chhaochharia and Laeven 2008; Dalton 
and Dalton 2008; Epps and Cereola 2008).  
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2.4 THE ROLE OF AUDITORS IN NIGERIA 
 
The role of auditors in corporate governance in Nigeria cannot be over emphasised. Auditors 
examine company’s account and produce a report that reflects the true performance of the 
company. Essentially the various corporate scandals reinforced the need to tighten the role of 
auditors such as financial reporting and corporate disclosures with the aim of restoring 
credibility and confidence in the corporate sector. In other words, auditors were given power 
by Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and Security of Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to examine accounts and detect misconducts, discrepancies and anomalies in financial 
statements of companies (Nwuche, 2012). The CAMA of 1990 was the first elaborate 
regulatory framework that provides the legal framework for corporate governance in Nigeria. 
CAMA 1990 replaced the Company’s Act of 1968 as a result of changes in the social, 
political and economic environments in Nigeria’s post-independence (Okike, 2004).  
 
For good corporate reporting to be achieved, the risk and control measures within the 
organisation must be put in place and also remain strong. In Nigeria, the code of corporate 
governance (2011) highlights the need for companies to develop strong internal control 
measures. These internal control measures put in place by the board for check and balances 
are preform through the audit committee, who appoints the auditors. The auditors ensure that 
the financial statements are a true reflection of the financial health and operations of the 
company (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
 
Essentially, the monitoring role of the board enhances good corporate governance practices 
by enhancing the effectiveness of the audit department in the interest of stakeholders. One of 
the expectations of the code is for auditors to be independent. According to Chen and Zhang 
(2012) auditors are able to report the true financial position of company. This is done by 
removing biasness and ensuring that good governance principles and standards are followed 
and adopted. This ensures that the legal position is in line with international regulations and 
also within the framework of acceptable standards and best practices of corporate governance 
(Fan and Wong, 2005). Therefore it is important to evaluate if the corporate governance is 
adequate enough to guarantee that auditors play an effective role in auditing company’s 
account and ensuring good financial reporting (Asare et al, 2008).   
 
Nevertheless, the corporate governance legislation in Nigeria has been historically weak 
(Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007; Adegbite, 2012). For example, the report on the observance 
on the standards and codes prepared by the World Bank reported that institutional failures 
regarding regulation, compliance, and enforcement of rules and standards contributed to poor 
corporate governance in Nigeria (ROSC, 2004. Also, the presence of multiplicity of codes 
contributed to problems for auditors and corporate practices in Nigerai (Osemeke and 
Adegbite (2016). Initially the multiplicity of codes was designed to check corporate frauds 
and malpractices in Nigeria, however, the corporate governance practices in the country are 
still poor. The recent history of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria stemmed from the 
lessons learned from the corporate malpractices and near-collapse of the Nigerian banking 
industry in the 1990s.  
 
Also, the magnitude of the Enron scandal and the global attention on corporate governance 
led to the formation of the SEC code in 2003 in Nigeria. It was the first code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria and its introduction improved the corporate governance system 
(Okike, 2007). However, there were numerous issues and challenges surrounding the 
implementation and enforcement of the SEC code, 2003, hence leading to the formation of 
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the CBN code of 2006. The CBN code was issued to address the above-mentioned 
deficiencies from the SEC code. Also, in 2008, the pension sector witnessed tremendous 
reforms, attracting the participation of investors into the pension sector and its fund 
management. The foregoing highlights the challenges and barriers surrounding the nature of 
auditors’ roles and corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. Hence our research inquiry is 
hinged upon the following research questions:  
 
2.2 Research Question 
 
1) What are the barriers to effective auditing? 
2) To what extent are auditors independent from the CEOs and other senior 
management? 
3) Explain what kind of gifts companies give to auditors? 
4) Describe the kinds of gift auditors receive from clients, and if they are allowed to 
receive such gift from client? 
5) Describe how good the company’s internal control structure is?  
6) To what extent did top management really adhere to these internal controls? 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
Part of the data have been used in another study. This research adopts a qualitative approach 
using interview method. This methodology offered an in-depth and detailed perspective of 
the auditors practices in Nigeria (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006; Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). 
During in-depth interview method there is a conversation between two persons namely the 
interviewer and interviewee. The interviewer asks questions with the goal of obtaining 
information that is of importance to the researcher (Creswell, 2003; Ritchie and Lewis, 2006; 
Saunders et al, 2007). Following the review of the 5 states, thirty-one (31) in-depth 
interviews were conducted. Generally, the interview method is one of the most important 
primary data collection methods involving communication (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002; 
Saunders et al, 2007).). In addition, the interviews are based on the perceptions and 
behavioural role of auditors, factors that encouraged them to undergo auditing and also 
factors that hinders them. The use of both note-taking and tape recording was employed as 
suggested by Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002) as very useful techniques in in-depth interviews 
while being aware of the disadvantages, such as, the respondents not wanting to answer 
sensitive questions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006; Saunders et al, 2007).  It is necessary to 
understand the facts relating to the behaviours, views and feelings of the auditors during 
auditing.  
 
3.1 CODING OF INTERVIEWEES RESPONSE 
The data used in this study was part of a doctoral thesis on culture and corporate governance 
(Osemeke 2013), and have been used in another paper. The data was collected through face 
to face – semi structured interviews, made up of 32 respondents in five different States in 
Nigeria. Five states were visited in Nigeria for data collection. These are Abuja, the capital of 
Nigeria; Lagos, the commercial centre; Delta and Rivers State, were the oil is located and 
Enugu, due to availability of data. The coding of interviewees from the five (5) states was 
done to protect the identity of those interviewed as agreed prior to commencement of the 
exercise as shown in the covering letter sent to them. The codes assigned to the interviewees 
are related to the departmental position and names of the company sectors. A summary of 
field interviews is provided on table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Summaries of Field Interviews  
Department/Position Industry Degree Gender 
Place of 
Interview 
Policy, Risk &Risk 
department Regulator BSc, MBA Female Abuja 
Deputy Director, HRM Regulator Bsc, MA, PhD Female Abuja 
Insurance and Surveillance Regulator Not specified Male Abuja 
Audit Regulator Bsc, MSC Female Abuja 
Assistant Director Regulator Not specified Male Abuja 
Policy, Risk &Risk 
department Regulator Bsc, Msc Male Abuja 
Policy, Risk &Risk 
department Regulator Bsc, Msc, PhD Male Abuja 
Health & Safety Petroleum Bsc Male Abuja 
Accountant Manufacturing Bsc, ACA Male Delta  
Supervisor, Sales 
Representative Telecommunication BSc Male Delta  
Regional Manager South 
East Telecommunication Pharmacy Male Enugu 
Middle Management Banking BSc, Pgd Male Lagos 
Middle Management Banking BSc Female Lagos 
Manager, Call Centre Telecommunication BSc Male Lagos 
Board Member Education BSc, Pgd Male Lagos 
Associate Big four Auditing BSc, ACCA Male Lagos 
HRM Telecommunication BSc, Msc Male Lagos 
Manager, Internal Audit Insurance BSc, Msc Male Lagos 
Manager, Internal Control 
Unit Insurance 
Bsc, Msc, 
ACCA Male Lagos 
Internal Control Group Banking Bsc Male Lagos 
Credit Control Telecommunication Bsc, MBA Male Lagos 
Middle Management Banking Bsc Female Lagos 
Attorney at Law Legal LLB Male Lagos 
Middle Management Banking Bsc Female Lagos 
Partner Big four Auditing 
Bsc, Msc, 
ACCA Male Lagos 
Marketing Executive Insurance Bsc Female Lagos 
SBO Banking Bsc Male Lagos 
Partner Big four Auditing 
Bsc, Msc, 
ACCA Male Lagos 
CEO, Drilling Oil and Gas  BSc, MBA Male Rivers 
Medical Doctor Hospital MBB Male Rivers 
Manager Petroleum Not specified Male Rivers 
Accountant Oil & Gas Bsc, ACCA Male Rivers 
 
The table above represent the demographic composition of interviewees, including their 
department, industry, educational qualification, gender and the state where the interview was 
11 
 
conducted. There were 32 respondents made up of 25 males and 7 females. 8 of these 
respondents were interviewed at Abuja; Lagos State 17; Delta State 2; Rivers State 4, and 
Enugu State 1. Two of these respondents occupying top management positions did not state 
their educational qualification. 
 
Respondents were asked to verbally confirm if they received an earlier email message sent to 
them indicating the confidentiality of their information and willingness to participate in the 
interview process. The participants were given the right to not answer any question and the 
right to stop the interview recording if they wished. Before the start of each interview, further 
information was provided to the respondent, including the researcher’s identity, the reason for 
carrying out the research, what would happen to the information collected, and how the 
outcome of the research would be disseminated. These explanations, which form part of the 
ethical consideration, were a welcomed development. Providing this information at the outset 
incited enthusiasm from the respondent’s and increased their willingness to be interviewed. 
The respondents were categorised into two groups. The first group represented the auditors 
that work in the top four auditing firms in Nigeria and the second group were employees, 
working in different companies, who have come in contact with auditors during their course 
of work. Of the 32 respondents 3 were auditors and the remaining 29 were managers working 
in different companies and from various disciplines such as banking, law, human resources 
management, internal audit, fashion design, and healthcare. Of the 3 auditors, 2 were partners 
and 1 associate.  
The interviews were recorded on a tape recorder and transcribed into a word document. Due 
to the fact that the sample is made up of two different groups of employees: auditors and non-
auditors, two different sets of interview questions was drafted. Non-auditors were asked 
questions relating to their company, and auditors were asked questions relating to their 
client’s company. For example, all respondents were asked to describe their company’s 
culture and their experience of working with the company. Thereafter, non-auditors were 
asked to describe their company’s internal control structure and if top management adhere to 
these controls, and the kind of gifts companies give to auditors. Auditors, on the other hand, 
were asked to describe the kind of gifts they receive from clients, and if they are allowed to 
receive such gifts from client. The auditors were further asked, based on their experience, to 
describe how good the client’s internal control structure is and if they think client’s top 
management in Nigeria really adhere to these internal controls. Furthermore, non-auditors 
were asked if they are aware were an auditor have come under pressure in carry out his/her 
work, and auditors on the other hand, were asked if they have come under pressure in carry 
out their work.  
Some respondents declined to take part in the interview due to tight work schedule. Consent 
was obtained from respondents for the interview to be tape recorded and when granted this 
was used throughout the interview. The comment from auditors and non-auditors were 
compared and contrasted to identify patterns. This process involves coding where themes are 
identified. 
This coding involved breaking down the data into smaller units called themes with labels 
attached to them with the use of Nvivo software (Miles and Huberman 1994; Langley 1999). 
The coding of data into themes ensures that the theories are grounded (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). Coding involved back and forth movement between themes until all the data was 
categorised, and then explored and explained (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Silverman 2001). 
This process of re-organisation involves moving back and forth between the data and 
theme/concepts (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Silverman 2001). The process was adopted in this 
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study in developing the themes into categories. The approach to data analysis was firmly 
grounded within the social science discipline (Van Maanen 1979). This grounded theory 
approach was adopted to help identify how management behaviour affects auditors work in 
Nigeria.  
 
4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1 TIME PRESSURE 
 
One of the findings identified is time pressure. Time pressure affects auditors working 
conditions. Examples of time pressure are: pressure to meet reporting deadlines, pressure to 
manage their time, pressure to manage information and pressure to manage a report. Okike 
(1994) noted that with a shift in Nigerian revenue from agriculture to oil resources, there has 
been an increase in economic activities and rapid development that has led to increase in 
demand for accounting and audit services. As a result, auditors have increased work 
pressures. Okike (1994) highlighted that this increased workload has caused chartered 
accountants to be sought as an employee, management consultant, valuer, auditor and 
reporting accountant for prospectus. Okike suggests that the accountant is appointed to probe 
into many areas of personal assets and corporate investigation, making the accountant a ‘Jack 
of all trades’ and in most cases ‘Master of a few’ (Okike 1994). Being a ‘Jack of all trades’ 
will create pressure. Some of these pressures could arise when they have limited time to carry 
out their audit assignment. As one respondent notes: 
 
‘May be they have a two week period to deliver on a given task that will take more 
than say a month. They will be working under pressure’ (Big four Auditing firm, 
External Auditor, Associate). 
 
Auditors want to ensure that clients provide the necessary documents before embarking on an 
audit assignment, which will enable them to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence. This 
makes their work easier and reduces work pressure. There are some assignments that require 
clarifications and explanations. Most of these explanations are to be supported by providing 
documentary evidence. If the client is not able to provide clear explanations and provide 
evidence it can put the auditors under pressure especially when there are tight deadlines.  
 
Often, managers adopt due diligence to study a target company they want to acquire. Due 
diligence involves detailed gathering of data on the target company such as gathering 
background information of the company, its operating activities, income statement, statement 
of financial position, and legal situation. This process of gathering information is about fact 
finding to identify potential risks and how they can be reduced and managed before making 
investment decision. With due diligence, auditors are expected to review their scope of work 
to accommodate wider range of sources to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence before 
reaching an audit opinion to determine whether management judgement on the riskiness of 
the project investment is viable. With tight deadlines, auditors might not be able to have the 
time to carryout detailed investigation and fact finding on a wide range of sources to ascertain 
management decision on the investment project. Auditors need considerable amount of time 
to gather wider range of sources. This will be very unlikely when there is time pressure to 
meet deadlines. One respondent notes: 
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One of the pressures auditors face that I could remember was when they were trying 
to audit a firm, it got to a point that the account was not balancing and they have a 
stipulated dead line and I think  probably they were very close to the due date, may be 
three to four days left. (Telecommunication, Manager, Call centre)  
 
Due to this tight deadline the respondent further stress that 
 
The pressure have to come no matter what. (Telecommunication, Manager, Call 
centre) 
 
Management behaviour can also contribute towards an auditor working under pressure 
(Owoyemi 1990; Wallace 1992). The auditor can be under pressure where there are 
irregularities or unethical practices perpetuated by the client’s company and the client is 
attempting to pressurize, mandate or compel the auditor to ‘cushion’ or prepare the financial 
statement in such a way that would be different from the actual or true position. So 
management to an extent can pressurize auditors to behave in an unethical manner. In most 
cases the auditors will compromise (Owoyemi 1990), usually to keep their job. Losing their 
job means that they might find it difficult to meet personal financial responsibilities (Wallace 
1992), considering the prevailing economic situation in the country (Okike 1998; 1999; 2004; 
2007). It was observed that there are only a few instances where an auditor will maintain an 
ethical stance when under pressure from management. The International Ethics Standards 
Board for Accountants (IESBA) Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants specify that the 
auditors should resign if these pressures will affect their opinion and independence. 
 
Researchers have shown that investors are not satisfied with the performance of auditors in 
the Nigerian environment (Wallace 1987; Ejimofor 1990; Adesina 1990; Eheigwe 1990, 
1991). From the experience of an audit test conducted by CBN on Nigerian banks in 2010 to 
ascertain the health of the banking sector, an interviewee noted that as a result of the global 
recession and the recent audit test conducted by CBN on Nigerian Banks, the auditors have 
faced increased pressure to refine the work they do and act in the interests of the 
shareholders. The interviewee further noted that they have been doing more audit work 
compared to the past, in order to deliver on an assignment. This pressure if not carefully 
managed can affect their job by misrepresenting the financial statement.  
 
Auditors should ensure that in planning their audit engagement, there is enough time 
available for them to embark on the audit which will enable them to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence. Also auditors might not be able visit branches (in situations where 
the company is located in different places) when enough time is not available. Having enough 
time-frame means that the audit work can be reviewed by another audit team or person 
(maybe a partner or senior auditor). This will reduce the risk of errors and promotes a quality 
audit, thereby ensuring that the information stated in the financial statement is materially free 
from errors. 
 
4.2 MANAGEMENT INTEREST 
Auditors do receive different kinds of threats from management of certain companies 
(Wallace 1992). Significant among them is a litigation threat. Some top management have 
personal interest they want to achieve. A number of these companies are ‘highly influential, 
connected or powerful’ and are sometimes affiliated with the federal government. This was 
supported by Ani (1990) when he noted that the council of ICAN did not use the initiative to 
monitor the implementation of the Assembly’s recommendation. If Ani’s statement is taken 
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into consideration, it means that in Nigeria, matters of crucial importance for economic 
development are manipulated by civil servants and politicians (Gormley 1985). As a result, 
when auditors are engaged by clients to carryout audit exercise, there are always some 
adjustments to make in the company books. As observed, there are lots of discussions and 
negotiations between the auditor and management, of which the management usually has the 
upper hand. Therefore most times the auditors are under pressure (Okike 2004). To illustrate 
this further an external auditors interviewed said: 
 
Some of these big companies have their personal interest… some of them are actually 
affiliated with the federal government. So…when the auditors come in to look at the 
records they have a little plus or minus adjustment to make in the balances of their 
books. I have notice a lot of discussions, negotiations and at the end they actually 
have upper hand. (Big four auditing firm, external auditor, Partner) 
 
Some respondents noted that auditors may be threatened by other instances. These instances 
could be a situation where some individuals in the organisation will tell the auditors to 
conduct their work in a certain manner. As observed, they could threaten the auditor in a 
number of ways to enforce their views. One of the respondents who was an audit partner said 
that those instances could exist, for example, in some situations where auditors are compelled 
to change or alter the figures in a given set of accounts. This statement was supported by 
Wallace (1992) when he noted that some auditors have been threatened or assassinated when 
they discover massive fraud perpetuated by the clients. Okike (2004) reported instances 
where auditors have been killed after concluding an audit assignment. For example, she noted 
that an audit partner of Osindero Oni Lasebikan & Co. was murdered while returning from an 
assignment in 1984 after discovering massive fraud. Also, Okike noted that the two auditors 
were murdered in quick succession when they knew or were aware of the details of the fraud 
that occurred in Guinness (Nigeria) Limited, in 1989.  
 
With these types of threats, auditors find it hard to sue the client when their life is being 
threatened or at risk. This is because the Nigerian judiciary system is weak in prosecuting the 
‘big men’ (Punch 2012) and the penalty put in place for misdemeanour by CAMA (1990) 
does not encourage compliance (Okike 2007). In Nigeria, almost every employee on the 
control trail of a transaction can be bribed, which makes internal controls ineffective 
(Wallace 1992). Auditors are faced with a difficult task in trying to plan their work to 
discover massive fraud, knowing full well the consequences of that action in a country where 
control and protection of life is weak (Wallace 1992). 
 
Okike (2007) noted that in most cases (especially in small and medium sized companies and 
audit firms), the auditors prepare the same financial statement they audit which is normally 
not disclosed in the audit report. She argues that this is due to the lack of qualified 
accountants and pressure on audit fees. This threat to auditor’s independence is provision of 
non-audit services to clients (Alabede 2012; Ojo 2006; Sikka 2009; Coyle 2010; Colbert 
2002; Goodwin and Seow 2002). Section 358(2)(c) of CAMA 1990 (now repealed) prevented 
auditors from providing non-audit services to clients in Nigeria. In this case, the IESBA Code 
of Ethics for Professional Accountants state that a separate audit team should be used to 
avoid self-review threat or the .  
 
Disclosure in the audit report for non-audit services does not seem to make much difference 
(Okike 2007). This is due to auditors not obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence 
before reaching a conclusion on the truth and fairness of the financial statement. Okike 
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(2007) noted that the reason for not obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence is due to a 
combination of weak accounting culture and pressure exerted by the client due to low audit 
fees and competition in the audit market. This presence of weak internal monitoring could 
render auditors powerless in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence (Wallace 1992). 
 
Another threat received by the auditor is familiarity threat. An interviewee noted that 
familiarity threat and the threat of litigation are the main types of threats received by the 
auditor. This familiarity threat arises when the auditor becomes more familiar with the 
company’s management thereby resulting in compromise or arm’s length transaction. It was 
discovered that some clients prefer to have an audit team made up of members that share 
similar cultural values with them or speak similar language. Sikka (2009) noted that this was 
a problem for Ernst and Young when they violated the code in 2004 by having an unethical 
relationship with a client in the US.  
 
This familiarity threat led to the CBN introduction of audit rotation for maximum of 10 years. 
This aligned with the Code of Corporate Governance (2011) which stipulates that external 
audit firms should not serve engagement for more than ten years and may only be 
reappointed after seven years of their disengagement. This rotation enables the new auditor to 
come in to audit the client’s account (DeFond et al 2002). The issue is that when auditors stay 
beyond a certain time limit in an organisation, their objectivity and independence might be 
affected.  
 
 
4.3 INCENTIVES 
 
Some companies do appreciate the services of the external auditor, so in return they may 
want to show some appreciation as a way of saying thank you. Some of these companies do 
give house utensils, home appliances etc. Most interviewees felt that if a home appliance is 
given to an external auditor such auditor will always remember their visit to such a company. 
An interviewee demonstrated by way of example by saying that if a set of cutlery is given to 
an auditor whenever he/she uses this item the auditors will remember the company.  
 
When asked, an external auditor that was interviewed noted that the collection of gift depends 
on the circumstances but generally they are not allowed to collect gifts because it is against 
their company’s policy. Usually, there is also a limitation if an auditor decides to collect gifts. 
The external auditor hinted that if it is a gift worth no more than N6,000 (six thousand naira, 
equivalent to £24), they are usually not considered expensive by management. The external 
auditor noted that there are some gifts that they can accept, most of which are narrowed down 
to products produced by the client. For instance, in a manufacturing industry that produces 
soap, after the audit they might give the auditors a carton of soap. If it is a banking industry, 
the auditor may receive items such as diaries, flash (USB) drives, items with the company’s 
logo. These are generally acceptable gifts, and perceived as corporate friendliness because 
they see the auditor as partners in progress. It could also be seen as a way of promoting their 
items to auditors and business contacts, and prolonging their relationship. An external auditor 
that works in one of the big-four auditing firm notes: 
 
After the audit they might tend to give us things like, may be, a carton of soap, things 
like that. Maybe in an industry like the banks they can give us their diaries, flash 
(USB) drive. Things that have their logos and the rest of them. So they are not really a 
big deal. (Big four auditing firm, external auditor, Associate) 
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In contrast, some respondents noted that what is most important is whether or not the client is 
trying to contravene the policy or terms of the audit engagement. But, usually, when a 
company is trying to hide certain information from the financial statement they may want to 
influence external auditors with a gift. The essence of the gift is to ensure that the company’s 
books will be reported in a way that will not represent a true and fair view, thereby, resulting 
in misrepresentation of the financial statement. Some of these gifts may be cars, buildings, 
land and properties. When auditors collect such gifts from management it could affect the 
way they do. Some of these top management personnel might have engaged in illegal deals 
that they do not want the auditors to expose. As a result, they may treat the auditors as ‘demi 
gods’ thereby giving different kinds of gifts in order to entice them. In trying to describe the 
way auditors are treated some respondents noted: 
 
Sometimes auditors are always treated to be Demi-gods in the Nigerian settings 
(Regulator, Deputy Director, HRM) 
 
Because they have a lot of dirty skeletons in their cupboard. Though they don’t want 
auditors to expose them so they will rather be treating them as Demi-gods, 
worshiping them so that the auditors will feel high. (Insurance, Internal Auditor) 
 
 
The head of an internal audit unit in a communication company that was interviewed noted 
that there is a limit on what auditors should receive as a gift. The interviewee highlighted that 
the professional requirement according to the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is that an 
auditor is not supposed to accept any form of a gift that is not corporate, and therefore the 
value of any corporate gift must not exceed $10. In the situation where such gift is given to a 
subordinate auditor, such subordinate should report it to the immediate boss. Hence, the issue 
of auditors’ independence and objectivity will not be affected (Gul et al 2009). The idea is 
that if an auditor collects a gift from a client there is that tendency for him to compromise on 
the audit standard. When asked why companies give auditors gift, while most of the 
respondents agreed that lunch are provided to auditors, they differ on the resultant effect it 
has on auditors’ judgement. A few of the comments from respondents are: 
 
We always provide breakfast and lunch for the external auditors in my bank on a 
daily basis. That’s one thing I know that we do. (Banker, Internal Control) 
 
But when they are coming to do their audit work they normally arrange lunch to be 
given to them. (Regulator, Audit)  
 
Detailed investigation of why management provide lunch to external auditors will provide 
more details on the objectivity of auditors’ independence. The reason why management 
provide lunch to auditors was contradictory. Some of the respondents noted that management 
sees auditors as part of the team, irrespective of whether or not they are not employed by 
them. It is the responsible of management to ensure that employees are taken care of 
including a conducive working environment of carrying out their duties. When management 
see external auditors as employees they have to make them feel comfortable with the work 
environment and not necessary to entice them. This could be done through provision of 
breakfast or lunch. As two respondents said: 
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Basically from my own experience I know that the hospitality will not be more than 
just lunch or breakfast which may not be material to affect the objectivity of auditor’s 
judgement but that is the best of my knowledge. I don’t know if it goes beyond that. If 
it’s beyond that it can be seen as bribe. (Oil and Gas, Accountant)  
 
The reason the respondents gave was that: 
 
If someone has been working for you he has to eat. He just has to the strength to eat 
and feel relax and comfortable to do his work. Is not really trying to buy them over 
because the provision of lunch is not really a big deal. (Oil and Gas, Accountant)  
 
So maybe they want them to relax, based on familiarity. (Banker, Internal Control) 
 
Other respondents noted that giving them lunch might be a very good opportunity to 
influence the objectivity of auditors’ judgement. Comments from respondents supporting 
these claims are:  
 
They give them warm reception to entertain them. Take them to big hotels in order for 
them to give the company a good record. That is the essence of trying to do all those 
things. The auditors will rate their company as the best compared to other companies. 
(Insurance, Marketing Executives) 
 
So most times what happens is that if the company you know has one or two things to 
hide they may want to influence an external auditors with gifts (Telecommunication, 
HRM) 
 
Because as an auditor if you collect anything from client there is that tendency that 
you are likely going to compromise standard because you have already receive 
something. (Insurance, Internal Auditor) 
 
May be a times they give them lunch. (Hospital, Medical Doctor)  
 
When probed further to ascertained why they give them lunch the respondent said: 
 
To cover up loopholes, I think that is why it is given to them (Hospital, Medical 
Doctor) 
 
Furthermore, as observed, most times auditors ask for money. An interviewee who is an audit 
partner hinted that generally some clients give them money. The interviewee noted that in 
most situations apart from money there is nothing else they ask for. If auditors accepts 
monetary gifts it could act as a barrier to their independence. When asked whether they are 
given lunch by clients the respondent answered in affirmative, saying ‘sometimes they give 
them lunch’. Why some respondents found nothing wrong in taking lunch, others noted that it 
is given to them as a way to entice them to cover up loopholes. One respondent said: 
 
 
Sometimes some auditors have decided to receive cash in lieu of hotel 
accommodations and so they discuss with their client to give them cash (money) for 
accommodation and they can go and stay elsewhere or anywhere they want to, which 
is not really a hotel accommodation. So they get a certain fixed amount of money from 
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the client in lieu of accommodation. (Big four auditing firm, external auditor, 
Partner) 
 
The same external auditor went further to say that: 
 
I have not seen a situation where an auditor is bought a house or is bought a car but I 
am saying it may exist, it may be there, and they all fall under gift items depending on 
who is giving the auditor the gift and depending on who the auditor is as well. Those 
kinds of hospitality I will not be surprise if they exist. (Big four auditing firm, external 
auditor, Partner) 
 
The gifts auditors receive could be to strengthen the relationship between auditors and their 
clients. It could also create incentives that threaten auditors’ objectivity and independence 
where an auditor fails to issue the going concern statement to companies that filed for 
bankruptcy (Blacconiere and DeFond 1997; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002) or issue an 
inappropriate audit opinion (Owoyemi 1990). 
 
This research observed that the issue of most auditors collecting gifts from clients applies to 
most companies in Nigeria. The results of the gifts auditors collect from clients affect their 
behaviour and compromise their objectivity when they collude with the client to produce a 
biased report. 
 
4.4 BRIBERY 
 
One of the key problems in Nigeria is corruption (Okike 2004; Fajana 2008). Auditors are 
supposed to be ‘watchdogs’ of society (Porter 1992). Okike (2004) noted that in a society like 
Nigeria where corruption is prominent, the independence of some of the auditors in the 
discharge of their duties is questionable. In such environment, the risk of auditors not 
applying professional scepticism will be high, leading to rise in audit failure (Wallace and 
Parker 1991; Kimbro 2002). Consequently the effectiveness of audit practices is determined 
by socio-economic, political and environmental factors (Okike 1994, 1999, 2007). A country 
that is unstable but fast growing could have accountability issues (Kimbro 2002). This does 
not imply that Nigeria is the only corrupt country (Wallace and Parker 1991), as there is 
corruption in most countries including both developing and developed countries (Wallace 
1987). Corruption is the major issue affecting internal controls as one respondent notes: 
 
‘Then of course corruption is very prevalent in our country, Nigeria, and some of 
these things actually drill down or also fissile themselves into our corporate 
governance and more especially corporate governance issues are actually affected 
and that is why these internal controls are not really functioning’ (Big four auditing 
firm, external auditor, Associate) 
 
Researchers have found evidence to support the existence of corporate frauds, lack of 
experienced management, basic infrastructures, tax evasion, communal and civil unrest, 
incessant change in government macroeconomic and fiscal policies, among others in Nigeria 
(Fajana 2008; Okike 2004; 2007; Ujunwa 2012). This portrays the nature of business culture 
that exists in Nigeria (Ujunwa 2012). There have been instances where government and host 
communities get involved with affairs of firms. In similar cases, company owners and 
managers serve their self-interest more than working towards achieving the goals of the firm 
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and they will try as much as possible to protect their interest by enticing auditors with money. 
Three respondents noted that: 
 
But following the Nigerian context, one of the key issue leading to our problems, 
challenges and under-development in Nigeria is corruption. The average Nigerian is 
corrupt. Corruption is not only happening in government alone, it happens in private 
sectors, even in our homes it happens. So, if you talk of auditor’s being entice, it is 
possible. Am not saying that I have seen one but even what happens in Nigeria it is 
very possible because people on a higher pedestal in terms of leadership, they are 
easily bribe left alone auditors. (INSURANCE, Internal audit)   
 
Those that give something to external auditor are those that have something to cover 
up, for example money. Money is a gift. (Banker, Manager) 
 
Auditors ask for money. I am just telling you the truth. Its money they give them. 
There is no other thing they ask for. (Hospital, Medical Doctor) 
 
Most of the corrupt practices that have resulted in corporate scandals that made headlines 
have been attributed to the failure of the auditing professions (Ajibola 1990; Inanga 1985; 
Wallace 1992). This research observed that corruption is posing a threat to some auditors. 
Therefore, it will be difficult to argue that auditors are not enticed with gifts. It will also be 
difficult to convincingly suggest that auditors do not accept bribes, taking into consideration 
the corruption in the Nigerian environment (Wallace 1987; 1992 and Okike 2004). An 
interviewee noted that it is possible for auditors to collect bribes in Nigeria because most 
people on a higher pedestal of leadership (top management) are corrupt and can easily be 
bribed let alone auditors. There have been instances where some companies have paid cash 
into relatives of an auditor’s account as a way to cover up the corruption activity. Wallace 
(1992) reported instances where chartered accountants have been involved in collusion, 
incompetence, negligence and fraud. Most of these transactions are often difficult to trace. 
They do not have audit trail because invoices are omitted and do not reflect in the financial 
statement. As a respondent noted: 
 
Then, if there are other gifts they give to them. There is a way management arranges 
them which is not very open because you cannot see where it is recorded that gifts are 
given to auditors or a teller or ticket they use in processing it. (Insurance, Internal 
Auditor) 
 
Wallace (1987) reported one of the cases where an investor based his opinion on the auditor’s 
report and invested in a company without knowing that the auditors colluded with client’s 
management to inflate the assets of the company. After two years the company was 
liquidated, the investor lost enormous investment and sued for damages. Okike (2004) noted 
that this is a challenge facing auditors and the accounting profession. Two respondents noted: 
 
‘The average Nigerian is corrupt’. (Telecommunication, Manager, Call centre) 
 
‘But, generally, when you talk of corruption or things like that, there could be 
gratification based on cash. It could even be in form of cars. It’s only when, except 
may be, they want to hide something then they could resort to giving other gifts. We 
heard companies that have given them cars as gifts depending on what the company is 
into and also depending on the strong hold of their financial base i.e. depending on 
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what their needs and financial based are’ (Big four auditing firm, external auditor, 
Partner) 
 
Section 550 of the IESBA Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants noted that 
accountants can be induced by gifts, friendship and hospitality (IESBA 2006). The IESBA 
code stressed that gifts in any form offered to auditors can create threats that undermined the 
adherence of fundamental principles. The implication of the gifts should be considered. 
IESBA noted that accepting gifts creates self-interest threats where auditors make attempts to 
conceal information or influence their decision (IESBA 2006). Intimidation threat are created 
when auditors accept gifts, this is followed by blackmail to bring the threat to public 
knowledge. Eventually the reputation of the auditor will be damaged. Auditors should put 
safeguards in place by not accepting gifts and to report such incidence to a higher member of 
staff or to those charged with governance (IESBA 2006). 
 
Owoyemi (1990) suggests that it is easy for clients to manipulate their auditors to cooperate 
with them to produce final accounts that suit the client’s purpose rather than report on the true 
and fair view of the client’s financial statement that will benefit users of the information in 
the accounts. In cases where auditors are found to have falsely misrepresented the financial 
statement, it might be difficult for management staff or the client to take legal action due to 
weaknesses in the legal framework. This paper concludes that auditors should be careful 
about the type of gifts they receive from clients in order not to jeopardise their independence 
by misrepresenting the financial statements. 
 
4.5 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Before 1990, there was no standard of auditing and professional code in Nigeria (Okike 1994; 
2007).  What audit firms used were the generally accepted auditing practices. Okike (1994; 
2007) further noted that, in 1989, the Institute of Chartered Accountant of Nigeria (ICAN) set 
up an Auditing Standards Committee (ASC) and Professional Practice Monitoring Committee 
(PPMC). The responsibility of PPMC is to monitor and periodically review the work done by 
its members. Okike (2007) noted that the mechanism ICAN used to effectively monitor and 
enforce compliance with its auditing guidelines is weak. It has been shown on the evidence 
from Okike (1998, 1999; ROSC 2004) that big audit firms that audit multinationals tend to 
comply better with international standards than with smaller audit firms. They argued that big 
audit firms regularly train their staff and ensure that their procedures reflect international 
standards to maintain the quality of an audit. Smaller audit firms are often unable to maintain 
these standards due to limited resources including cost and manpower. 
 
There are punitive measures ICAN uses for disciplining errant members for violating the 
code of ethics (Okike 2007). For instance, it has an Accountant’s Investigating Panel (AIP) 
and a Disciplinary Tribunal. Despite the punitive measures in place, ROSC (2004) reported 
that AIP is compliant-driven in its monitoring function rather than proactive. ROSC further 
reported that AIP is not keen to sue for damages in a court of law or report cases of 
negligence to ICAN. Regulators are discouraged from seeking legal action to enforce 
standards due to the length of time it takes to conclude a case in the Nigerian court (ROSC 
2004) 
 
The report from ROSC (2004) on reported cases of those that are sued was similar to the 
result found in this research. This research found that there have been instances where 
auditors have been sued, although the rate at which they are sued is relatively low. That is 
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why it is difficult to find an auditor that has been sued. One of the factors that contribute to 
the low rate of auditors being sued is that the majority of clients settle cases out of court. The 
reason they settle out of court is that as the case progresses the auditors and the clients could 
compromise their stance. When they compromise their stance it simply means that the auditor 
or whoever is behind the case has agreed to some terms. When those terms are agreed, the 
case is struck out of court and the matter is closed. There have been instances where auditors 
that were sued have been found guilty and were prosecuted. One of the reasons is when they 
do not give accurate accounts of records and it amounts to fraud, which is a criminal offence. 
However, based on the responses from respondents the number of those prosecuted is 
relatively small. 
 
Despite the fact that Section 368(2) (3) of the CAMA (1990) specifies procedures on how the 
company or shareholder can sue auditors for negligence in the event of loss or damage, Okike 
(2007) reported that most cases of litigation against the auditor and audit firms are rarely 
reported. Nevertheless, ROSC (2004) and Wallace (1987) reported that most auditors prefer 
to settle cases out of court. Likewise, auditors are not compelled to take out professional 
indemnity insurance. 
 
Finkle and Shin (2010) and Leshem (2009) argued that one of the reasons people settle out of 
court is because of the attitude of some lawyers. Their argument was based on the fact that 
when the plaintiff seeks the advice of an attorney, the plaintiff is provided with information 
on whether he or she will win the case versus the option of accepting the defendant’s 
settlement offer. They concluded that the attorney in most cases advises the plaintiff to 
consider and accept settlement out of court even without investigating the case. In this 
situation the attitude of challenging the auditor through a legal battle will be reduced since 
the lawyer will advise for settlement out of court.  
 
When the plaintiff does not have the required information about the case, they can accept 
settlement out of court. Even if the plaintiff has the required information but does not have 
the resource for legal fees, accepting settlement out of court becomes the only option 
available (Farmer and Pecorino 2005). Silva et al (2007) noted that accepting bribe depends 
on the motive of the management. If the management were corrupt they would want to seek 
the advice of a corruptible auditor that is willing to be influenced and misrepresent the 
financial statement. 
 
Likewise, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) observed that when resources are transferred across 
a number of sources, this creates room for corruption. They further noted that the cost of 
managing corruption is expensive and top management will want to prevent intervention 
from those opposed to corruption. As they suggest, one of the ways to ensure they are not 
opposed is to create rents (loopholes) for bureaucrats that will allow misallocation of 
resources. 
 
Furthermore, Farmer and Pecorino (2000) and Farmer and Terrell (2001) noted that in some 
cases the judges adopt non-neutral positions that bias the outcome of the case. Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen (2001) stated that the crime rate in Japan is high. They noted that personnel 
officers could penalise Judges for taking neutral positions. Since Judges want to protect their 
jobs as Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2001) argued, the probability of adopting a neutral stance 
would be minimal. When people begin to feel that the outcome of their case is already biased, 
they can accept to settle out of court. Based on the above arguments, this paper concludes that 
in Nigeria it might be difficult for management to sue or take legal action against auditors for 
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misrepresenting the financial statement taking into consideration the weaknesses that exist in 
the legal framework. 
 
4.6 CONFLICT FROM CODES CONCERNING THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AND 
AUDITORS 
 
The conflict in the codes, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) regarding the person who 
oversees the function of the internal and external auditors has resulted in impediments to 
proper functioning of the auditors in Nigeria (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). For instance, 
the CBN code limits the independence role of the audit committee, which shall in addition to 
overseeing the bank’s internal audit function, be involved in monitoring the activities of the 
external auditors, while the NAICOM code allows the audit committee to recommend the 
appointment of external auditors to the board and they shall be accountable to the board 
(Code of Corporate Governance, 2011). Making external auditors accountable to the board 
not only reduces the degree of accountability required for effective auditing by auditors but 
also weakens the corporate governance regulation. However, the SEC code recommends an 
independent reviewer team different from the audit committee and external auditor to handle 
these functions (Code of Corporate Governance, 2011). In this case, the external reviewer 
team shall monitor the activities and performance of both the internal and external auditors 
rather than the audit committee as in the case of the CBN and NAICOM codes.  
 
The SEC and CBN codes also disagree on the reappointments of external auditors. Whilst the 
SEC code stipulates that reappointment may occur seven years after their contract expires; 
the CBN code recommends reappointment after a period of ten years (Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2011). Furthermore, the SEC code (2003) stipulates that the chairman of the 
audit committee should be a board member, which is in line with PENCOM and NAICOM 
codes’ recommendation, but the SEC code 2011 remains silent on who should be the 
chairman (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016).  
 
According to an interview respondent 
‘multiplicity of codes affects the good functioning of our internal auditors because 
these numerous codes creates confusion and our auditors sometimes find it difficult to 
know which one to adhere to as some codes favours audit committee while others do 
not’ (Big four auditing firm, external auditor, Associate). 
 
The discussion above suggests that the independence of auditors is crucial to effective 
auditing and corporate governance because if the independence of the board is compromised, 
companies can capitalize on it to give misleading financial reports to the public. Hence 
sending mixed signals to stakeholders particularly managers who might choose which code to 
comply with or ignore during disclosures (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016).  
 
The CBN code recommended rotation of Nigerian auditors after 10 years. This finding is in 
line with an earlier study that fingered culture as an important factor in explaining audit 
quality in Nigeria (Kida, Saidu, & Urama, 2013). Similarly the ethical behaviours of the 
Nigerian Auditors was investigated and findings show that the Nigerian Auditors do not 
adhere to their professional ethics in discharging their duties, do not follow their professional 
code of practice and are incompetent. They lack independence, accept gratification and bribe 
and compromise their client information (Oghojafor, Olusoji & Owoyemi, 2012b) researched 
on influences that can impact on corporate governance. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper discussed the auditors’ independence and the role they play in carrying out their 
work in the Nigerian environment. Auditors are expected to obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence before reaching a conclusion on the subject matter in order to ensure that the 
financial statements give a true and fair view. This paper found that auditors find it difficult 
to obtain such audit evidence as a result of the pressures they face. Some of these pressures 
include gifts, tight deadline, weak legal framework, bribery and corruption that exist in the 
environment. This paper also found that in situations where auditors are working under 
pressure or decide to accept gifts from clients or become too familiar with a client’s 
management, they could issue inappropriate audit opinions. 
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